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 ABSTRACT  
 
This paper analyzes welfare effects of revenue neutral tax reform using a small open economy 
dynamic general equilibrium model. We apply this model to the Korean data and examine welfare 
effects of various tax reforms; removal of capital income tax and/or labor income tax financed by 
consumption tax. We investigate both long run equilibrium and transitional dynamics. The results 
suggest that there are sizable welfare gains (1-3% of lifetime consumption) when factor income taxes 
are replaced by consumption tax. Overall gains are generated by long run gains despite short run 
welfare losses. However, there is welfare loss when capital income tax is replaced by labor income 
tax. 
 
 
 
 
본 논문은 조세제도의 개편이 (기존의 세
수를 유지하는) 경제 및 효용에 미치는 영
향에 대해 소국경제를 위한 동적 일반균형
모델을 한국경제에 적용하여 분석한다. 여
러 가지의 조세제도 개편의 효과를 분석하
는데, 특히 기업의 법인세나 가계의 근로
소득세를 소비세(부가가치세)로 대체하는
경우 단기 및 장기적으로 어떠한 효과가 있
  
는가를 살펴본다. 모델의 결과에 따르면 
이같은 세제개편은 대체로 경제 전체의 
효용을 1~3% 정도 증가시킨다. 단기적
으로는 경제가 나빠지지만 장기적인 이익
이 단기적인 효용감소를 능가한다. 하지
만, 기업의 법인세를 낮추고 이를 가계의 
근로소득세로 대체할 경우, 경제 전체의 
효용은 낮아진다. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
One of the key policy questions in macroeconomics is the optimal tax structure. In 
particular, many economists have analyzed welfare effects of tax reforms (Lucas 1990, 
Greenwood and Huffman 1991) such as a removal of capital income tax replaced by 
consumption tax.1  These studies showed that the removal of capital income tax reduces 
distortions in the production sector and increases investment, which results in substantial 
welfare gains.  While most studies on this subject used closed economy model, Mendoza 
and Tesar (1998) used a two country setup and examined how welfare consequences of tax 
reforms change when countries can trade in world capital markets.  They showed that the 
possibility of international borrowing and lending can provide larger welfare gains from tax 
reform in the expense of foreign countries, compared to the closed economy case. 
This paper investigates welfare effects of potential tax reforms using a small open 
economy model calibrated to the Korean data.  The model exhibits unique characteristics of 
a small open economy with large trade sectors such as Korea.  Government implements 
revenue neutral tax policy reforms using three types of tax instruments---labor income tax, 
capital income tax, and consumption tax.  In particular, I examine dynamic welfare effects of 
capital income tax reform; a reduction in capital income tax rate compensated by an increase 
in other tax rates in the economy such as consumption or labor income taxes.  I also 
experiment with a reduction in labor income tax replaced by consumption tax.  First, I 
calculate the exact magnitude of changes in consumption tax rates that can satisfy 
intertemporal government budget constraint under the tax reform.  Then, we simulate the 
model to trace the optimal responses of the main macroeconomic variables over time to such 
tax reforms and provide quantitative assessment of welfare effects of such tax reforms.  
Eventually, this paper can provide policy implications on the optimal tax design problem in 
Korea. 
While the tax reform issues have been rigorously debated in policy circles, only a few 
studies have examined the impact of fiscal reform programs using an open economy dynamic 
multi-good general equilibrium model.  Most existing models in tax literature are limited to 
static partial equilibrium models and unable to reflect efficiency gains associated with 
accumulation of capital.  This is a particularly important issue since capital income tax 
affects transitional dynamics pertaining to the implementation period of a reform program.  
Moreover, international trade in financial assets has not been considered in previous models 
despite that it is crucial to consider international borrowing and lending channel to analyze a 
small open economy such as Korea. 
Simulation results show that revenue neutral capital income tax reform generates sizable 
welfare gains (1.4% increase in lifetime consumption) when lost revenue is financed by 
consumption tax.  However, when capital income tax is replaced by labor income tax, 
overall welfare slightly decreases.  Negative effects of an increase in labor income tax 
exceed positive effects of capital income tax removal. Removal of labor income tax financed 
by consumption tax generates similar welfare gains (1.4%), while the removal of both capital 
and labor income taxes (financed by consumption tax) generates large welfare gains (about 
                                            
1 See, for example, Jorgenson and Yun (2001), Auerbach and Hassett (2005), and Feldstein (2006). 
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3% of lifetime consumption). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 introduces model with 
consumers, firms and government.  Section 3 explains solution method adopted in this paper, 
in particular shooting algorithm.  Section 4 describes model parameters and calibration for 
the simulation exercises.  Section 5 presents the main results of the paper including welfare 
analysis and impulse responses of main macro variables to various tax policy combinations.  
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
Ⅱ. Model 
 
 
We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model applied to a small open 
economy that captures the main structural characteristics of developing countries.  
This model provides a laboratory environment in which we can conduct 
computational experiments to evaluate the welfare implications of various 
combinations of tax policies. 
The model allows the interaction of households, firms and government.  
Households consume three goods---exportable, importable and nontraded 
goods---and supply labor and capital to firms.  Their labor income and capital 
income are subject to tax and the households also pay tax for their consumption.  
The model incorporates both current account and capital account transactions by 
allowing households to borrow and lend in international financial markets using 
one-period risk-free bonds (incomplete financial markets).  Firms use labor and 
capital to produce nontraded and exportable goods.  We assume that capital good 
that is used to produce exportable good is imported, while capital for the production 
of nontraded good is domestically produced.  The government must finance an 
exogenous stream of expenditures through domestic taxes. 
 
 
1. Consumer 
 
Two production sectors exist in domestic economy: exportable good 
sector (x) and nontraded good sector (n), while consumers consume an 
additional imported good (m).  We reduce the multi-good problem into a 
single good problem by using composite commodities.  Price of composite 
consumption good c (consists of consumption of good x,n, and m) is p 
(which can be interpreted as CPI and real exchange rate since pm is a 
numeraire). 
A representative consumer solves 
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and capital accumulation equations 
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where Bt denotes the quantity of discount bonds purchased in period t maturing 
in t+1, Rt is the bond price, Tt is the net transfers from governments in a lump-sum 
fashion, and τ is tax rates (τl= labor income tax, τnk= tax on capital income from 
nontraded sector, τxk = tax on capital income from exportable sector, and τc = 
consumption tax).  Bt is the international bonds and therefore denotes the net 
quantity purchased irrespective of the issuing country.  Note that bonds are priced 
in terms of import goods and net transfers are in terms of nontraded goods.  
Investment tax credit is incorporated in the budget constraint. All the prices are 
normalized in terms of import goods (pm)--which means that px is price of export 
good in terms of import good---the terms of trade---and pn is price of nontraded 
good in terms of import good.  Note that ixt, kxt, and vt are imported goods with 
price pm. 
Composite good ct consists of consumption on three goods, cm, cn, and cx as 
follows: 
 
[ ] 1,11111 =++++= −−−− nmxntnmtmxtxt bbbcbcbcbc γγγγ .         (5) 
 
Total expenditure on consumption can be expressed as the sum of expenditure on 
each good: 
 
xtxtntntmttt cpcpccp ++= ,           (6) 
 
where pt is the price of composite good ct.   
Maximizing (5) subject to (6) yields an equilibrium expression for relative 
demand for each consumption good and the price of the composite consumption 
good: 
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2. Firms 
 
Production functions for nontraded and exportable goods are 
 
αα −= 1)( ntntntnt hkAy ,           (11) 
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No profit conditions are 
 
ntntntntnt hwkry += ,           (13) 
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where v denotes the imported intermediate good used to produce export good.  
Ant and Axt are defined as productivity in production function which is assumed to 
be constant at one in this deterministic model. 
 
 
3. Government 
 
Government budget constraint is 
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where Gm and Gn are exogenous government spending on imported and 
nontraded goods, respectively. Tt is net lump-sum transfers (denominated in 
nontraded goods) to the consumers. 
We can combine the government's budget constraint with the consumer's budget 
constraint and construct the two simplified aggregate budget constraints for 
nontraded and traded sectors as follows: 
 
ntntntnt Gicy ++=             (16) 
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Ⅲ. Solution Method 
 
 
The exercise that we are interested in this paper is to derive conditional changes 
in welfare (between pre- and post-reform states) and to derive transitional paths of 
main economic variables.  First, we combine all first order conditions for consumers, 
firms and government and construct a large system of nonlinear equations. We can 
calculate the analytical solutions for the steady states in the pre-reform state.  In 
order to derive solutions of this dynamic system, we employ a linear approximation 
method around the deterministic steady state because these types of nonlinear 
equation system cannot be solved analytically.  However, linearization around the 
initial steady state can generate large approximation errors because new tax rates 
change the steady states and the model economy evolves away from the initial 
steady state. Therefore, we need to linearize around the new steady states.  
However, we do not know the new steady state value of asset holdings because of 
indeterminacy that arises in the incomplete market models with bonds.2   
In order to control this problem, we adopt the shooting algorithm as in Mendoza 
and Tesar (1998) and calculate the appropriate value for the post-reform steady state 
asset holding position that is consistent with the debt-accumulation dynamics of the 
pre-reform equilibrium.3  Detailed algorithm is as follows. We first assume that the 
post-reform steady state value of bond holding is equal to initial value and linearize 
the model around the post-reform steady state. Then, we undertake the policy 
experiment and simulate the model for 2500 periods, and calculate the new bond 
holding that is consistent with debt-accumulation dynamics. We update the 
post-reform steady state bond holding with this value and repeat this algorithm until 
bond holding converges to a fixed point. 
                                            
2 Refer to Kim and Kose (2003) for the analysis of nonstationarity and linearization issues. 
3 In Mendoza and Tesar (1998), they use the shooting algorithm to study the effects of various types of 
tax policy combinations. We use the same shooting logic for our simulation. 
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Fiscally responsible tax reform assumes that when one tax rate changes, 
government changes other tax rates to maintain intertemporal government budget 
constraint. We hold government spending and lump-sum transfers constant at the 
pre-reform level. In order to calculate the appropriate amount of tax rate changes 
that satisfy intertemporal government budget constraint, we adopt the second 
shooting algorithm. The algorithm checks whether the intertemporal budget 
constraint holds at a given asset holding position and tax rates. If not, the algorithm 
updates the appropriate changes in tax rates. We assume that the government life 
span is 200 quarters (50 years) to simulate the intertemporal budget constraint. 
Finally, we combine the two shooting algorithms to ensure that both tax rate and 
long run bond holding positions are consistent with the model solution. 
 
 
Ⅳ. Calibration 
 
 
We calibrate the parameter and steady state values of the economy by adopting 
commonly used values for developing countries in the literature. In the benchmark 
experiments, we use the following parameter values, reported in the Table 1. We fix 
the value of β at 0.96 to match the annual steady state world real interest rate of 4%. 
The share of consumption in Cobb-Douglas utility, θ, is set at 0.34. The value of risk 
aversion parameter σ is equal to 2.61 which is the estimate from the panel study by 
Ostry and Reinhart (1992). 
Shares parameters (bm, bn, bx) in the CES form consumption function are set to 
match the actual consumption shares in the data. The data show that the 
consumption share of export good is 11%, import good share is 21% and the 
nontraded good share is 68%.4    The value of γ (inverse of the elasticity of 
substitution in the aggregate consumption) is set at 0.782 which is very close to the 
value used by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001). 
We set the depreciation rate at 13% for both production sectors, which is 
estimated by the Bank of Korea and also within a range of commonly used values in 
the literature. The elasticity of the marginal adjustment cost function η of the 
exportable and nontraded sectors is set to 3, to match the volatility of investment in 
the data. Labor share in the export good production ω is set at 0.2. Others have used 
numbers ranging from 0.12 to 0.45 (Kouparitsas, 1997). Share of capital against the 
imported intermediate good m is set at 0.55 (Kose, 2002). Elasticity of substitution 
between capital and imported intermediate good ψ is set at 1.35 following Kose 
(2002). Capital share in the non-traded good sector, α, is set at 0.7. This number is set 
rather high compared to other studies in order to match the tax revenue structure in 
Korea. Data shows that tax revenue from consumption, labor income and capital 
income taxes are 35%, 40%, 25%, respectively. The current .parameter values match 
this tax revenue structure. 
Measuring aggregate tax rates is a complex and difficult task and there is little 
consensus on effective tax rate measures. Mendoza et al. (1994) calculated effective 
                                            
4 We take the averages of the consumption shares between 1985 and 1996. Details of how we 
construct the sectoral production and employment data are reported in Kim and Ahn (2004). 
 Dynamic Welfare Effects of Tax Reform        185 
 
 
<Table 1> Parameters and steady state values of the model 
Parameter Description Parameter Values 
Preferences 
　 Discount factor, annual 0.96 
　 Coefficient of relative risk aversion 2.61 
　 Share of consumption in utility function 0.34 
　 Inverse of elasticity of substitution 0.78 
bm Weight of importable goods (in consumption) 0.21 
bx Weight of exportable goods (in consumption) 0.11 
bn Weight of nontraded goods (in consumption) 0.68 
Technology 
Exportable Goods Sector 
μ Share of labor income 0.20 
　 Coefficient of intratemporal elasticity of substitution 1.35 
m Weight of capital input in the CES composite 0.55 
　x Depreciation rate, annual 0.13 
　x Elasticity of marginal adjustment cost function 3 
Nontraded Goods Sector 
α Share of capital income 0.70 
　n Depreciation rate, annual 0.13 
　n Elasticity of marginal adjustment cost function 3 
Other steady state values 
gm Government expenditure in importables (ratio of  pxyx) 13.5% 
gn Government expenditure in nontradables (ratio of  yn) 13.5% 
T Net transfers (ratio of y)  
nx Net exports (ratio of  y) 0 
px Price of exportable good (index) 1 
Tax rates  
　c  Consumption tax 17.5% 
　l  Labor income tax 16.1% 
　kx  Capital income tax in exportable sector 21.8% 
　kn  Capital income tax in nontraded sector 21.8% 
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tax rates for G-7 countries by dividing actual tax payments by corresponding 
national accounts. These effective tax rates reflect government policies on tax credits, 
deductions, and exemptions as well as information on statutory tax rates. Moreover, 
they are consistent with the concept of aggregate tax rates at the national level and 
with the assumption of representative agents.5  In this paper, we follow the method 
in Mendoza et al. (1994) and calculate the aggregate effective tax rates of Korea. Data 
are taken from the 2004 National Income Accounts and Revenue Statistics by the 
OECD. 
The effective consumption tax rate is measured by dividing actual consumption 
tax payment (general taxes on goods and services + excise taxes + import duties) by 
pre-tax value of consumption (private final consumption expenditure + government 
final consumption expenditure -- compensation of government employees - 
consumption tax payment). One problem in measuring labor and capital income tax 
rates is that the government does not provide a breakdown of income tax revenue 
according to its sources, whether it is from labor or capital income. Therefore, we 
first measure general income tax rate of the household assuming that all sources of 
the household income are taxed at the same rate. Household's overall income is 
estimated by taking the sum of wages and salaries, operating surplus and net 
property income of the households. We can calculate the effective income tax rate by 
dividing household income tax revenue by the overall household income, which is 
around 10.7% in 2004. Labor income tax rate can be calculated by dividing total labor 
income tax payment (income tax rate multiplied by wage and salaries + all social 
security contributions) by the tax base (wage and salaries + employer's social 
security contributions + payroll taxes). Capital income tax payment is the sum of all 
corporate tax payments (including taxes on immovable properties and financial and 
capital transactions). Tax base is operating surplus of all corporations. We can 
calculate the effective capital income tax rate by dividing tax payment by tax base. 
Table 2 reports the properties of tax rates of Korea in comparison to G-7 countries. 
Effective tax rates in Korea (in 2004) are 17.5%, 16.1% and 21.8% for consumption, 
labor and capital income tax, respectively. We use these values for the steady state 
tax rates (τc, τl and τk) in the model economy. Average tax rate for consumption in 
Korea is higher than G-7 countries, while both labor and income tax rates are much 
higher in G-7 countries (G-7 averages are 36% and 38%, respectively) than in Korea. 
Note that G-7 data are from 1996, so the tax rates can be lower in 2004 in these 
countries. 
We set the ratio of government expenditure in nontraded and imported goods at 
13.5% of output. This number is derived by dividing total government spending by 
GDP in 2004. With given tax rates and government spending, the model generates 
the steady state aggregate transfers to the households at minus 1.6% of GDP. We use 
this number for the steady state value of T. Initial asset holding position (which is a 
free parameter) is set to zero.  px is set to one (in the small open economy, price of 
exportable good is exogenously determined). 
 
 
 
                                            
5 These estimates, however, can be sensitive to cyclical factors and shocks to tax revenues and bases. 
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<Table 2> Comparison of effective tax rates of selected OECD countries 
(percentage points) 
Country Consumption tax Labor income tax Capital income tax 
Canada 10.37 32.63 50.66 
France 15.97 50.08 26.11 
Germany 16.40 42.38 23.91 
Italy 14.72 49.77 33.86 
Japan 6.00 27.44 42.61 
UK 15.25 24.41 47.17 
US 5.47 27.73 39.62 
average 12.02 36.35 37.71 
Korea 17.50 16.10 21.80 
Note: Reported tax rates are constructed by the method in Mendoza et al. (1994). Korean data are from 2004 
and based on the OECD Revenue Statistics and National Accounts.  Other OECD countries' data are 
from 1996 and taken from the updated version of Mendoza et al. (1994). 
 
 
Ⅴ. The Effects of Tax Reforms 
 
 
Tax reform in this paper is defined as the reduction in capital income tax rate 
and/or labor income tax rate. We analyze various levels of reduction; complete 
removal of capital and/or labor income tax, and reduction of tax rates to 10%. Since 
capital income tax is levied on capital in both export good and nontraded good 
productions and capital in exportable goods sector is imported, a uniform reduction 
in capital income tax in both sectors have complicated effects on the model economy. 
We assume that governments balance their intertemporal budget constraint by 
changing tax rates permanently. In other words, we only consider time-invariant 
one-time changes in tax rates. In particular, each tax reform in capital and labor 
income taxes is accompanied by changes in consumption tax rate. As a benchmark 
case, we analyze the tax reform financed by lump-sum taxes, which enable us to 
isolate the effects of tax reform from the effects of changes in other tax rates. 
We first solve the pre-reform benchmark model to derive steady state values of 
the economy. Then, we use the double shooting algorithm to derive the necessary 
changes in tax rates to satisfy intertemporal government budget constraint after the 
tax reform. Table 3 reports the results. In case of a complete reduction in capital 
income taxes in both sectors, if the reform is financed by consumption tax, the new 
consumption tax rate should be 28.6%. If it is financed by labor income tax, the new 
tax rate should be 29% (an increase from 16.1% in the pre-reform state). When labor 
income tax is reduced to zero, consumption tax rate should increase to 30.7% in 
order to satisfy the intertemporal government budget constraint. When both capital  
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<Table 3> Calculating necessary changes in tax rates to maintain intertemporal 
government budget constraints 
(reducing capital income tax) 
　kx, 　kn Consumption tax Labor income tax 
21.8% 17.5% 16.1% 
10% 23.5% 23.3% 
0 28.6% 29.0% 
(reducing labor income tax) 
　l Consumption tax  
16.1% 17.5%  
10% 22.5%  
0 30.7%  
(reducing both capital and labor income tax) 
　k　　　l Consumption tax  
 17.5%  
10% 28.7%  
0 42.8%  
 
 
and labor income taxes are reduced to zero, the new consumption tax rate should be 
42.8%. When the tax rates are reduced to 10%, necessary changes in other tax rates 
are less than the amounts in the case of a complete removal. 
With this newly calculated tax rates, we analyze dynamic responses of the 
economy to the tax reform. We compare both changes in steady states and 
transitional dynamics. Following Lucas (1987), the welfare effect of the reform is 
measured as a constant percentage change in consumption that leaves the consumer 
indifferent between the lifetime utility in pre- and post-reform including the 
transitional periods (labor input is fixed at the pre-reform steady state). We further 
decompose welfare effects into long-run effects and transitional effects. Long run 
welfare effects measure differences in the life time utility in pre- and post-reform 
steady states, while transitional effects (or short-run effects) measure changes of 
welfare during the transitional periods from pre-reform to post-reform steady state 
equilibrium. 
 
 
1. Comparison of welfare effects 
 
Table 4 summarizes welfare effects of different combinations of tax rate changes. 
This section explains the table by comparing welfare gains of various tax policies,  
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<Table 4> Welfare gains from tax reform(percentage increase in lifetime consumption) 
(removing capital income tax)   
  Lump-sum tax C-tax L-tax 
transitional gains -1.05 -0.81 -0.57 
long run gains 4.40 2.21 0.13 
overall gains 3.35 1.40 -0.44 
(removing labor income tax)   
  Lump-sum tax C-tax  
transitional gains -0.32 -0.13  
long run gains 3.45 1.52  
overall gains 3.13 1.39  
(removing both capital and labor income tax) 
  Lump-sum tax C-tax  
transitional gains -1.40 -1.00  
long run gains 7.77 3.95  
overall gains 6.37 2.95  
Note: C-tax: consumption tax, L-tax: Labor income tax 
 
 
while the next section examines impulse responses of main macro variables to find 
out driving forces of these welfare results. The followings are four main results 
regarding welfare gains. 
 
(1) Revenue neutral capital income tax reform (complete removal) generates 
sizable welfare gains when lost revenue is financed by consumption tax (1.4% 
increase in lifetime consumption). However, when lost revenue is financed by an 
increase in labor income tax, welfare gains become negative (a loss of 0.44 % of 
lifetime consumption). 
(2) A complete removal of labor income tax financed by an increase in 
consumption tax generates a similar amount of welfare gains as in the case of capital 
tax reform (1.4%). 6   When both capital and labor income taxes are removed 
(financed by an increase in consumption tax), welfare gains become large (2.95% 
increase in lifetime consumption). 
(3) All these gains in tax reforms financed by consumption tax are less than half of 
potential gains when lost revenue is recovered by lump sum taxes. 
                                            
6 The case of capital income tax financing is not analyzed because the model generates an explosive 
path for optimal solution under the current parameter values. 
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(4) In all cases, overall welfare gains consist of transitional welfare loss and large 
long run welfare gains. 
 
 
2. Dynamics of welfare gains 
 
In this section, we analyze the dynamic effects of various combinations of tax 
reforms; a removal of capital income tax, a removal of labor income tax, and a 
removal of both capital and labor income taxes financed by lump sum tax, 
consumption tax or labor income tax. Table 5 presents impact effects and long run 
effects of various tax reforms for each tax reform reported in table 4 (total seven 
cases). We analyze the effects of tax reforms on sectoral variables (output, 
consumption, wage, labor, investment, capital in each sector), aggregate variables 
(national income account items) and various external and internal balances (trade 
balance, tax revenue, fiscal balance). 
We first analyze the case when capital income tax is replaced by lump sum tax. 
Responses of the sectoral variables match intuitive explanations. Without capital 
income tax, price of capital in the economy (rx and rn) decreases in the long run. 
Therefore, investment (and capital) in both exportable and nontraded sectors 
increases on impact (11-12%) and in the long run (26-43%). In the long run, factor 
inputs, output, consumption in all sectors increase. In exportable sector, there is a 
high level of substitution between labor and capital, and the production uses more 
capital and less labor on impact. In the nontraded sector, labor and capital inputs are 
complementary and both inputs increase on impact. Aggregate consumption, 
investment and output all increase in both short and long runs. Trade balance 
initially worsens as imports decrease less than a decrease in exports in the short run 
but it improves into surplus in the long run. This is because exportable sector capital 
is imported and a reduction in capital income tax prompts more import of this 
capital good. Tax revenue and fiscal balance initially decrease as capital income tax is 
removed, but they become positive as the economy grows. 
When lost revenue is financed by consumption tax, an increase in consumption 
tax depresses an increase in consumption in both short run and long run, which 
results in much less welfare gains in both short and long run compared to the lump 
sum tax financing. Output and factor inputs in both sectors increase much less now. 
Optimal amount of leisure is higher now (both short and long run) as consumption 
becomes more expensive due to a tax hike. 
We can observe dramatic changes in impulse responses when government 
finances removal of capital income tax with labor income tax. Government should 
increase labor income tax from 16.1% to 29%. Post-reform overall welfare now 
decreases by 0.44%. Negative effects of an increase in labor income tax exceed 
positive effects of capital tax removal. This is because capital stocks change from the 
second period (investment from the first period) but labor income tax changes labor 
input from the first period of the tax reform. Therefore, the effects of labor income 
tax hike dominate the first period's welfare. We can see this in the effects on labor 
input on impact; 15% and 4% decreases on impact in x and n sectors. Aggregate 
consumption decreases by large amounts in both short and long runs. On the other  
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<Table 5> Dynamic Effects of Tax Reform 
 
CASE 1. No capital income tax(τk=0) 
 Financed by C-tax Financed by L-tax 
Welfare 
Financed by lump-sum 
transfers (C-tax: 17.5% to 28.6%) (L-tax 16.1% to 29%) 
Transitional -1.05 -0.81 -0.57 
Steady state 4.40 2.21 0.13 
Net change 3.35 1.40 -0.44 
 
 impact long-run impact long-run impact long-run 
Sectoral variables (percentage changes) 
yx -4.26 35.55 -4.79 25.34 -5.16 16.75 
yn 3.23 17.59 0.93 11.90 -0.94 7.29 
cx 12.80 7.34 4.78 0.40 -1.75 -5.22 
cm 12.80 7.34 4.78 0.40 -1.75 -5.22 
cn -6.09 13.16 -8.69 5.85 -10.85 -0.08 
hx -12.28 21.25 -13.70 12.12 -14.70 4.43 
hn 7.78 0.93 1.19 -3.95 -4.17 -7.91 
wx 9.88 11.79 10.67 11.79 11.29 11.79 
wn -5.62 16.51 -1.15 16.51 2.83 16.51 
ix 12.12 43.32 8.06 32.53 4.91 23.44 
in 10.92 25.55 8.16 19.48 5.96 14.55 
kx 0.00 43.32 0.00 32.53 0.00 23.44 
kn 0.00 25.55 0.00 19.48 0.00 14.55 
rx -5.39 -6.34 -5.78 -6.34 -6.09 -6.34 
rn 1.29 -6.34 -0.25 -6.34 -1.63 -6.34 
v -3.71 36.53 -4.18 26.25 -4.51 17.60 
p 8.70 -2.78 6.62 -2.78 4.72 -2.78 
pn 12.54 -4.05 9.53 -4.05 6.79 -4.05 
Aggregate variables (percentage changes) 
Output 5.70 24.48 2.68 16.59 0.17 10.03 
Consumption 7.96 8.18 1.54 1.19 -3.82 -4.47 
Investment 20.51 28.23 14.93 20.72 10.35 14.51 
Capital 8.28 28.23 6.29 20.72 4.48 14.51 
Leisure 0.17 -3.23 1.72 -0.93 2.95 0.98 
Aggregate variables (ratio of output, percentage point changes) 
Trade Balance -3.66 2.95 -2.76 2.39 -2 1.84 
Export -5.79 3.09 -4.44 2.56 -3.26 2.03 
Import -2.10 0.16 -1.64 0.20 -1.21 0.23 
Tax revenue -3.08 -3.95 -0.35 -1.40 -0.17 -0.76 
Fiscal balance -0.86 0.12 -0.50 0.46 -0.49 0.50 
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<Table 5> Continue 
CASE 2. No labor income tax (τl=0) 
 Financed by C-tax 
Welfare 
Financed by lump-sumtransfers 
(C-tax: 17.5% to 30.7%) 
Transitional -0.32 -0.13 
Steady state 3.45 1.52 
Net change 3.13 1.39 
 
 impact long-run impact long-run 
Sectoral variables (percentage changes) 
yx 0.77 18.65 0.24 7.25 
yn 3.93 9.98 1.51 3.84 
cx 15.65 13.59 6.05 5.20 
cm 15.65 13.59 6.05 5.20 
cn 5.44 13.59 2.11 5.20 
hx 2.32 18.65 0.74 7.25 
hn 13.09 9.98 5.02 3.84 
wx -1.30 0.00 -0.46 0.00 
wn -8.33 0.00 -3.39 0.00 
ix 5.34 18.65 1.87 7.25 
in 3.83 9.98 1.44 3.84 
kx 0.00 18.65 0.00 7.25 
kn 0.00 9.98 0.00 3.84 
rx 0.76 0.00 0.27 0.00 
rn 3.57 0.00 1.45 0.00 
v 0.67 18.65 0.21 7.25 
p 4.78 0.00 1.99 0.00 
pn 7.03 0.00 2.93 0.00 
Aggregate variables (percentage changes) 
Output 5.86 14.43 2.31 5.59 
Consumption 13.75 13.59 5.40 5.20 
Investment 9.16 12.93 3.55 5.00 
Capital 4.64 12.93 1.93 5.00 
Leisure -3.00 -4.70 -1.13 -1.82 
Aggregate variables (ratio of output, percentage point changes) 
Trade Balance -1.64 1.51 -0.65 0.65 
Export -2.68 1.46 -1.09 0.62 
Import -1.03 -0.05 -0.44 -0.02 
Tax revenue -3.40 -4.08 -0.17 -0.57 
Fiscal balance -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.06 
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<Table 5> Continue 
CASE 3. No labor income tax and capital income tax(τl=0, tk=0) 
 Financed by lump-sum transfers Financed by C-tax 
Welfare  (C-tax: 17.5% to 42.8%) 
Transitional -1.40 -1.00 
Steady state 7.77 3.95 
Net change 6.37 2.95 
 
 impact long-run impact long-run 
Sectoral variables (percentage changes) 
yx -2.98 55.34 -4.38 33.35 
yn 8.05 29.51 2.73 16.34 
cx 29.55 21.83 11.04 5.81 
cm 29.55 21.83 11.04 5.81 
cn -0.87 28.44 -6.65 11.55 
hx -8.87 38.96 -12.61 19.28 
hn 21.56 11.16 6.33 -0.14 
wx 8.30 11.79 10.05 11.79 
wn -13.70 16.51 -4.68 16.51 
ix 20.86 64.24 11.22 40.99 
in 16.81 38.27 10.31 24.21 
kx 0.00 64.24 0.00 40.99 
kn 0.00 38.27 0.00 24.21 
rx -4.61 -6.34 -5.48 -6.34 
rn 4.07 -6.34 0.96 -6.34 
v -2.60 56.47 -3.82 34.31 
p 12.36 -2.78 8.26 -2.78 
pn 17.83 -4.05 11.91 -4.05 
Aggregate variables (percentage changes) 
Output 11.78 40.21 5.04 22.77 
Consumption 20.88 22.79 6.57 6.65 
Investment 31.94 43.40 19.29 26.60 
Capital 11.77 43.40 7.86 26.60 
Leisure -3.12 -7.85 0.51 -2.73 
Aggregate variables (ratio of output, percentage point changes) 
Trade Balance -5.36 3.78 -3.47 2.84 
Export -8.26 3.79 -5.50 2.98 
Import -2.88 0.02 -2.00 0.17 
Tax revenue -6.83 -7.85 -0.35 -2.09 
Fiscal balance 0.13 -0.08 -0.34 0.28 
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hand, the amount of leisure increases in both short and long runs, because people 
have less incentive to provide labor due to an increase in tax and the relative price of 
leisure becomes cheaper. 
Next, we analyze the tax reform that removes labor income tax financed by lump 
sum or consumption tax. Removal of labor income tax (financed by either lump sum 
or consumption tax) does not change long run prices (including wages and rental 
rates). This is because there is no change in the intertemporal optimization 
conditions in the production sector. Both labor and consumption taxes work through 
intratemporal optimality conditions only. Wages decrease on impact because more 
labor is available due to labor income tax cut. Removal of labor income tax decreases 
the amount of leisure (agents now work harder) on impact and in the long run. 
Factor inputs, output and consumption (in both sectoral and aggregate data) increase. 
Financing by consumption tax decreases the magnitude of changes in all variables, 
compared to the case of lump sum tax financing. 
The last two panels in table 5 show the case when both capital and labor income 
taxes are removed (financed by lump sum or consumption tax). Significant welfare 
gains are observed; 6.37% gain in lifetime consumption with lump sum tax financing 
and almost 3% gains with consumption tax financing. Directions of changes in most 
variables are all in the same line as expected. 
 
 
3. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
In this section, I change some key parameter values and examine how the main 
welfare results change. Results are reported in Table 6. I focus on the case of a 
complete removal of both capital and labor income taxes financed by an increase in 
consumption tax. First, I lower the depreciation rate in investment in both sectors to 
7% (from 13%). Necessary changes in consumption tax rate (41%) are similar to the 
benchmark case (42.8%), while overall welfare gains increase from 2.95% to 4.36% of 
permanent consumption. This is due to a large increase in long run welfare gains. 
Low depreciation rates increase the persistence of capital accumulation and magnify 
the permanent effects of capital income tax cut. On the other hand, an increase in 
elasticity of marginal adjustment cost function (η=6 from 3) does not change the 
results much.  This is because η mostly affects the volatility of investment, not the 
first order dynamics. 
An increase in the share of labor income in export sector (μ=0.4 from 0.2) slightly 
lowers welfare gains to 2.29%, because capital income tax cut now has less positive 
effects with a larger labor share in production.  Lowering capital income share in 
the nontraded sector (α=0.5 from 0.7) lowers overall welfare (2.45%) due to the same 
reason. 
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<Table 6> Sensitivity Analysis(Removing both capital and labor income taxes 
financed by an increase in consumption tax) 
  Welfare Gains 
 new C-tax rate Transitional Long run Overall 
Original model 42.8% -1.00 3.95 2.95 
     
With low depreciation rate 41.0% -1.24 5.61 4.78 
         (δ = 5%)     
With large labor share in EX-sector 40.6% -2.08 4.37 2.70 
        (μ = 0.4)     
With high elasticity in adjustment 
cost 42.6% -1.42 4.46 3.47 
         (η = 6)     
With small share of capital income 
in NT sector 41.5% 1.23 0.8 2.45 
        (α = 0.5)     
Note: welfare gains are percentage increase in lifetime consumption 
 
 
 
Ⅵ. Conclusion 
 
 
In this paper, we develop an intertemporal optimization model that is calibrated 
to the Korean economy and provide quantitative analysis on the effects of revenue 
neutral tax reforms (removal of capital and/or labor income taxes financed by an 
increase in consumption tax). The results show that such reforms can bring sizable 
welfare gains to the economy (1 - 3 percent increase in lifetime consumption). Since 
consumption tax is the least distortionary tax policy tool compared to factor income 
taxes, it is natural to observe welfare gains when the factor income taxes are replaced 
by consumption tax. These results, however, can change when economic structures 
change. For example, the results may change when capital in exportable sector 
domestically produced.  There are several possible extensions of this paper; what 
are the effects of international capital market restrictions on the welfare effects of tax 
reform? What happens if there are collection costs in domestic taxes? This model and 
solution method can be easily applied to a specific country and provide realistic and 
quantitative welfare implications of various types of fiscal policies. 
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